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Economic Slowdown and Stabilization Policy
THE PACE OF real economic acivity remains sluggish and, once recovery begins, how strong will it
sluggish, as the response to last year’s monetary be? (2) What are the prospects for an easing in infla-
and fiscal restraint continues. Despitc the slowdown tionary pressures? The course of prices and output in
in production and employment, the pace of inflation coming quarters will be influenced greatly by mone-
has not yet moderated significantly. tary and fiscal actions which have already occurred,












Growth of total spending for
goods and services began slowing
in late 1969, in response to anti-
inflationary monetary and fiscal
actions. Such spending rose at a
4 per cent annual rate from third
quarter 1969 to second quarter
1970, following an 8 per cent aver-
age rate of advance in the previ-
ous five quarters. Continued rapid
increases in prices, reflecting ex-
cessive total demand in the pre-
vious five years, along with the
reduction in growth of total spend-
ing, resulted in a decline in real
product. Total real output (GNP
adjusted for changes in prices),
which rose at a3per cent average
annual rate in the five quarters
ending third quarter 1969, de-
clined at a 1 per cent rate from
third quarter 1969 to second quar-
Major quest1ons regarding the economy include:
(1) How long will r >al econom1c activity continue o
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ter 1970. Industrial production,
which is usually more sensitive
than total output to changes in
total spending, has decreased at a
3 per cent average annual rate
since mid-1969. This decline in
production follows a rise of 4.9
per cent from mid-1968 to mid-
1969 and a 6.5 per cent gain in
the previous year.
Moderated growth of total
spending and output first had
little effect on employment growth
which did not slow appreciably
until early this year. Finns ap-
parently were reluctant to reduce
their work forces until the reduced
growth of total spending proved
more than temporary. By historical
standards, the labor market was
verytight early in 1969, with almost
65 per cent of the population of
labor force age employed, com-
pared with an average of 62 per
cent in the Fifties and early
Sixties. Because labor had been
unusually scarce, the competitive
costs of hiring and training personnel probably con- the same as in the previous year. In contrast, consumer
tributed to employer reluctance to lay off workers in prices rose at a 3.8 per cent average rate in 1967 and
late 1969 and early 1970. Reflecting this lag in ad- 1968 and at a 1.2 per cent rate in the 1961-64 period.
justment of the work force to changes in the growth Wholesale industrial prices have risen at about a 4 per
of total spending, total employment did not slow cent rate since last fall, about the same as in the
significantly until March of this year, but has since previous year.
declined at a 2 per cent rate. Nevertheless, 64 per Continued rapid inflation in the face of moderated
cent of the population of working force age has growth of spending, output and employment is con-
been employed this summer, a greater proportion than sistent with past experience in the U.S. economy
at any time in the Fifties and Sixties prior to 1967. (Table I).
Slowing of growth in spending,
output and employment has not yet
resulted in a clear reduction in the
rate of increase of prices. Inflation
apparently is no longer accelerat-
ing, but a decline in the rate of ad-
vance of prices has not yet been
firmly established. The broadest
measure of prices, the implicit price
deflator for GNP, increased at a
5.4 per cent annual rate in the first
half of 1970, about the same as in
the last half of 1969. Consumer
prices have increased at about a6
per cent rate since December, about
lobe I
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For example, in 1957-58 the rate of price in-
crease did not begin to recede until about a year
after output growth slowed, and in 1960-61 the lag
was about three quarters. The main difference be-
tween the most recent period and other periods of
slowdown is the greater momentum that inflation was
allowed to achieve in the 1964-69 period than in previ-
ous periods. The length of time required to achieve
relative price stability, such as during the 1961-64
period, is likely to be considerable. Not only has in-
flation been allowed to achieve rates higher than in
other inflationary periods in the postwar U.S. economy,
but the degree of monetary and fiscal restraint has
been less than in other such periods.
Recant Monctniy and hscal. Ad.lons
The course of spending, output and prices in recent
quarters appears to have responded normally to mon-
etary and fiscal actions. Economic developments in
the second half of 1970 will depend in large measure
on policy actions already taken in the first half of the
year. Both monetary and fiscal actions have been
more expansive in 1970 than in 1969, though such
stimulative policy actions have persisted for only a
relatively short period.
Fiscal actions — Federal budget actions in the first
half of 1970 were dominated by several factors affect-
ing disposable income: a 6 per cent pay increase for
Federal employees, retroactive to the beginning of
the year; an increase in the Social Security benefit
schedule, also retroactive; and a reduction in the tax
surcharge on January 1. Reflecting these actions, the
high-employment budget moved from a surplus of
about $11 billion in the year ending in first quarter
SEPTEMSER, 1970
1970 to a $3.6 billion rate in the second quarter of
1970. This reduced rate of surplus was in marked
contrast to the $10 billion average annual rate of
deficit in the high-employment budget in 1967 and
1968
The national income accounts budget moved from
a $9 billion surplus in 1969 to a $14 billion annual
rate of deficit in the second quarter of this year. This
budget, in contrast with the high-employment budget,
is influenced by variations in growth of total spending
in the economy, as well as changes in Federal ex-
penditures and tax rates. Consequently, the national
income accounts budget is misleading as a measure
of fiscal actions. Reduced growth of total spending,
and thus of income and profits, contributed to a drop
in Federal tax receipts at a $5 billion annual rate
from fourth quarter 1969 to second quarter 1970.
Monetary actions — Monetary actions became rela-
tively expansionary in early 1970. The money stock
rose at a5per cent annual rate from the three months
ending February 1970 to the three months ending in
August, after changing little in the second half of 1969.
Acceleration of money stock growth reflected
more rapid expansion of Federal Reserve credit and
bank reserves since February. Federal Reserve credit
grew at a 7 per cent annual rate from February to
August, compared with a 3 per cent increase in the
previous year
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and the money stock since early 1970 has been accom-
pained by a sharp acceleration in the growth of dine
deposits, reflecting primarily a decline in market in-
terest rates and changes in Regulation Q. This regula-
tion has been changed twice this year (January 21
and June 24), each time in the direction of increasing
the maximum rates which banks are permitted to
offer on time deposits. As a result, banks became more
competitive in bidding for funds, and time deposits at
commercial banks have increased sharply since Janu-
ary. Total time deposits increased at an 11,5 per cent
annual rate from January to June. Since June, these
deposits have increased yet more rapidly, at a 37 per
cent annual rate, reflecting the suspension of ceilings
on rates paid for large certificates of deposit maturing
in 30 to 89 days. Over half of the increase in time
deposits since June has been in large certificates of
deposit. Since January, these CD’s outstanding at
commercial banks have increased by $9 billion, off-
setting a large part of the $13 billion decline from
December 1968 to January 1970.
The large inflow of time deposits has been accom-
panied by an increase in bank credit at a 10 per cent
annual rate since February. Over the previous year,
the level of bank credit remained essentially un-
changed. The recent upsurge of bank credit reflects
partly an increase in Federal Reserve credit, and to
that extent represents an increase in total credit in the
economy. But the bulk of the increase in bank credit
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flowing through nonbank credit channels. From late
1968 to early 1970, banks were not able to compete
effectively for funds with open market interest rates
which were generally above the Regulation Q ceilings.
With the increase in ceilings in 1970 and the general
decline in short-term market interest rates, banks have
been able to bid funds away from these other markets.
The yield on Treasury bills fell from a 7.87 per cent
average in January to 6.41 per cent in August. Long-
term corporate rates, however, rose slightly on bal-
ance; the rate on corporate Aaa bonds rose from 7.91
per cent in January to 8.13 per cent in August.
Projections of Total. t~pcndrng,
Prices and Ontput
Monetary and fiscal actions of recent months will
continue to affect total spending in the second half of
1970, but a more complete assessment of forthcoming
developments requires assumptions about the future
course of monetary and fiscal actions,
The pattern of fiscal actions for the year ending
June 30, 1971 can be assessed by looking at Federal
budget plans for that period. Current estimates in-
dicate Federal spending in fiscal 1971 will be about
5 per cent higher than last year. The large increase in
expenditures in the second quarter of calendar 1970
was associated with the Government pay increase and
rise in Social Security benefits, and is not considered
indicative of a trend. To provide projections of total
spending, prices, and output beyond mid-1971, Fed-
eral expenditures were assumed to grow at a 6 per
cent annual rate after mid-1971.
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[-‘or purposes ol projecting total spending, two alter- Real product would grow moderately in the coming
native courses of monetary action are considered. A year, then increase at about a 3.5 per cent rate in the
5 per cent rate of growth in money for the two-year year ending in mid-1972. Such a policy would most
period starting in second quarter 1970 would be eon- likely result in the rate of increase in prices being
sidered as a moderately stimulative course of mone- down to about 3.5 per cent by mid-1972.
tary action. A 3 per cent rate of monetary expansion A slower rate of growth of money, for example 3
for the next two years would be a moderately restric- per cent, would probably result in a more moderate
tive monetary policy. 4 per cent advance of total spending in the coming
An optimal rate of monetary expansion must be year, about the same as in the first half of 1970. From
selected on the basis of a choice among attainable mid-1971 through mid-1972, total spending would in-
combinations of price and output increases in coming crease about 5 per cent. Real product, under such a
quarters. With the effects of past excessive total de- policy, would most likely decline slightly through mid-
mand still working through the economy, a period of 1971, then increase slowly in the following year. Such
relatively slow advances in output is probably neces- total spending growth would probably reduce the rate
sary to complete the adjustment from the accelerating of inflation to below 3 per cent by mid-1972.
inflation experienced since 1965. If the most likely
length of this correction process is not taken into ac- jc,Lltj’
01 7:I50p,~~j015A Lt’05t5c52/.)t
count in the determination of stabilization actions, -- - ‘ ‘‘~‘ -- -
what might appear to be a strong recovery, resulting Economic forecasting based on econometric models
from stimulative monetary and fiscal actions, would continues to be imprecise, and information concern-
prove only temporary. The adjustment process in- ing the past forecasting performance of a given modcl
volved in unwinding from the 1965-69 inflation can should be carefully considered before such a model is
be expected to be long and painful, but it may be used as a guide in policy formulation. To assist the
even more painful if not consistently pursued. reader in forming his own judgment about the re-
liability of projections based on research conducted Estimates made by this Bank indicate that if Fed-
at this Bank, some comparisons are presented to cast
eral expenditures grew at a 5 to 6 per cent annual light on the model’s forecasting reliability.
rate and the money stock were mcreased at a 5 per
cent rate from the quarter ending in June, the growth To examine the reliability of projections, the equa-
rate of total spending would most likely be about 5 tions of the model were estimated using the experi-
to 6 per cent in the year ending in mid-1971, and .. t
See A Monetanst Model for Economic Stabilization, this
7 to 8 per cent in the following year (Table 11)1. Review (April 1970), pp. 7-25.
Page 6FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS SEPTEMBER 1970
ence of the period from 1953 through 1968. Observa-
tions since the beginning of 1969 can then be used
to gauge the performance of the model in simulating
the effects of monetary and fiscal actions in 1969 and
1970. For 1969 and 1970, observed monetary and
fiscal developments were treated as if they were
known in advance to the forecaster; thus forecasts
of these policy variables were not considered as a
factor contributing to error in the projections.
The results of this simulation experiment are
shown in Table III. Observed values for the varia-
bles are shosvn along with model estimates. Econo-
metric model-building has not yet progressed to the
point where the models are able to capture accurately
quarter-to-quarter movements in the variables. What
is important in assessing forecasting reliability is the
degree to which marked and sustained over- or under-
estimation is avoided.
Examination of the forecasts of total spending for
1969 and the first half of 1970 indicates that the
model succeeded in projecting the pattern of total
spending growth. The model underestimated the in-
crease of total spending in the second and third
quarters of 1969, and overestimated the change in
succeeding quarters. For the six quarters as a whole,
total spending increased at a 5.9 per cent average
annual rate, while the model projected a 5,8 per cent
rate of increase.
Model forecasts of real output change also tracked
actual movements quite closely on average. Real out-
put change corresponded closely
to total spending change, and
the model succeeded in produc-
ing that similarity of movement.
For the six-quarter period, total
output increased at a 0.7 per cent
average annual rate; the model
estimated a 1.4 per cent average
rate.
Forecasting the course of prices,
which has been a prime concern
in the U.S. economy in recent
years, did not satisfy the criterion
of avoiding over- or under-estima-
tion. The model did succeed in
that it did not project any decline
in the rate of price advance before
1970, though it did not succeed in
projecting the degree to which in-
flation accelerated in 1969 and
early 1970.
The upward movement of un-
employment as a percentage of the labor force in 1969
and 1970 was projected by the model, though the in-
crease was over-estimated in 1969. The long-term
interest rate was tracked very closely by the model in
1969, but the projections fell below the actual rates in
the first half of 1970. Since only two quarters havetran-
spired yielding these discrepancies between actual and
predicted, it is probably tooearlyto form ajud~nentas
to whether the criterion of marked and sustained over-
or underestimation is violated. The short-term interest
rate was consistently underestimated by the model,
though the pattern of increasing through 1969 and then
declining in 1970 was projected by the model,
CoirrcI!uskin-:~-
A continuing period of uncomfortable adjustment
to reduced inflation may be in prospect for the U.S.
economy. Given Federal budget plans for fiscal 1971,
stimulative monetary actions could bolster output and
employment, but any significant gains in the battle
against inflation would be sacrificed. On the other
hand, more restrictive actions aimed at reducing the
inflation rate rapidly would probably give rise to fur-
ther cutbacks in output and employment.
Projections based on research at this Bank appear
to be most reliable with respect to growth of total
spending. Projections of the other variables of the
model, though useful and informative, should be ac-
cepted tentatively. Additional observations will pro-
vide further basis for a judgment about the reliability
of model projections for these variables.
Table III
SIMULATION OF THE EFFECTS OF MONETARY AND FISCAL ACTIONS’
1969 1970
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Rote of Changr n Nominal GNP
Actual /.5 / 3 P8 3.9 3.’ 4.9
Model Es?inlato 7.6 6 2 5 / 4.9 40 64
Rate of Change p Pea’ GNP
Ac’ual to 2.2 2.7 2.9 29 0.6
Model Es’imate 3.2 1.7 I 3 0.5 0.2 2.2
Rate of change ir- GNP Pi cc Deflator
Actual 4 6 4.9 5 8 4.7 6.6 4.3
Model Es’imate 4.3 4.4 44 4.8 4.2 4 1
Unemp~oyr’ert Rate
Actijal 3.4 3.5 36 3.6 42 4.8
Model Estimate 36 3.7 3.9 4 1 44 41
corporate Aao Rate
Actual 6 7 69 / 1 7.5 /.9 8 1
Model Estimotr 6.6 6.8 7 I /.2 7 1 6.9
Commercial Paper Rate
Actual 6.7 7.5 8.5 8.6 86 8.2
Model Estimate 5.8 6 2 6.7 6.9 6.5 5 9
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